Not a Forgotten but a Willfully Neglected War

Tanzir Ahmed

Introduction

Despite the UN’s categorization of it as one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, the Third Sudanese Civil War (2023 – present) hardly ever appears in headlines. As of January 2026, 33.7 million Sudanese people were in need of humanitarian assistance—roughly two-thirds of the country’s total population and nearly double the entire population of the Netherlands (18 million). Given the severity and scale of suffering in the country, Sudan receives a shockingly meager amount of international attention, particularly in comparison to the Iran, Gaza, and Russo-Ukrainian Wars. This article examines the conditions that have led to this neglect, focusing on domestic and international media coverage of the conflict, foreign powers’ interest in Sudan’s resources, and the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The main parties participating in the Civil War are the government, led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the rebels, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The most influential foreign power involved is the UAE, which backs the RSF.

The Role of Media 

As a consequence of the Civil War, both the RSF and SAF have increasingly targeted journalists. In the 3 years since the conflict began, 16 journalists have been killed, mostly by the RSF: the group has repeatedly weaponized starvation and sexual assault to silence journalists in its territories. In SAF-controlled territories, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention of journalists who shine light on SAF crimes and corruption are also becoming increasingly common. According to a 2024 report by the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, 90% of Sudan’s media infrastructure had been destroyed and looted, with many journalists left unemployed as a result of the war. Further, internet access in Sudan is frequently cut off, leaving citizens unable to show the rest of the world what is happening in their country or obtain updates about the conflict themselves. The combined effect of a lack of reliable information coming out of Sudan and a media already consumed by following developments in Iran, Gaza, and Ukraine has left little willingness to educate the general public on the Sudanese Civil War, to the benefit of the RSF and the UAE: last year, the RSF massacred thousands of people in El-Fasher and faced virtually no consequences from the international community for doing so. Sudanese Freelance journalist Hassan Berkia said it best: “The war in Sudan is not a ‘forgotten war,’ but a willfully neglected one. Sudanese lives have been traded away to serve external interests.” In a similar vein, Mathilde Vu, writing in the New Humanitarian, lamented that newsrooms often focus more on military offensives, counteroffensives, and the belligerents, effectively erasing the people who suffer the consequences of the violence and their stories.

Financial Incentives for Neighboring Countries

Sudan is a nation rich in two valuable natural resources: gold and gum arabic, a type of resin used as an emulsifier in soft drinks and pharmaceuticals. Before the start of the civil war, Sudan controlled 70-80% of the market share of gum arabic; however, as the conflict has raged on, exports from Sudan have cratered at the same time as exports from neighboring countries, such as Chad and South Sudan, have risen considerably. The cause? Smuggling of gum arabic: realizing the potential for financial benefit, the RSF has seized control of trade routes and border crossings, looting supplies of extracted gum and implementing levies on traders in its territory. By moving the product through neighboring countries, who then label it a domestic product, the gum arabic can be certified as conflict-free, enabling the RSF to bypass sanctions and sell it to companies in Europe, primarily in Germany and France. The trade greatly benefits the RSF, as well as middle and destination countries, at the heavy cost of the prolonged suffering of the Sudanese people. Despite reported efforts to do their due diligence, the companies buying gum arabic cannot fully trace the product to its source and therefore directly fuel the conflict through their continued purchases. 

70% of Sudan’s national revenue is dependent on gold, and since the beginning of the civil war, it has become a

“currency for arms,” with both the RSF and SAF benefiting from its sale. Most of the gold smuggled out of RSF- or SAF-controlled areas ultimately ends up in the UAE, where it is melted and recast, erasing traces of its conflict origins. The RSF smuggles gold from its territory through countries allied with the UAE, namely Chad, South Sudan, Libyan National Army-controlled Libya, Kenya, and Uganda. The SAF, on the other hand, sells the vast majority of its gold to its ally Egypt, where the smuggled product enters formal trading circuits and typically moves on to the UAE. Through the revenue generated by this illegal trading, both the RSF and SAF are able to acquire military supplies, prolonging the civil war. 

Friends in High Places 

Because of the UAE’s extreme wealth, it has the ability to buy the loyalty, or at least the silence, of many states. The 5 permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council all have good relations with the UAE, effectively giving the country a carte blanche to do whatever it wants and suffer minimal consequences: according to The Guardian, the United Kingdom has been actively discouraging African states from criticizing the UAE. The UAE has further strong economic ties with many European nations, making them quite unlikely to openly critique the UAE’s support of the RSF. With a P5 member intimidating those countries who might be inclined to speak up and the bought silence of other powerful nations, the likelihood of any meaningful sanctions is quite low. 

Additionally, since many of the countries neighboring Sudan have positive formal relations with the UAE, they are already extremely hesitant to openly condemn the country or intervene militarily against the RSF, giving the RSF a resistance-free path to continue to commit crimes against humanity. Some of these countries, like Ethiopia, have even directly helped the RSF: according to a Reuters report published in February, the UAE built a

secret camp in Ethiopia to train RSF soldiers, an accusation that both the UAE and Ethiopia have publicly denied. 

Conclusion

The unique political and economic context of the Sudanese Civil War has prevented the conflict from receiving the amount of international attention it deserves. Over the course of the past three years, 90% of the country’s media infrastructure has been destroyed, and most critical journalists have been imprisoned, killed, or sexually assaulted, making local reporting both difficult and extremely dangerous. Many neighboring states are profiting from the war as intermediaries in the smuggling of gold and gum arabic, a process which discourages said states from speaking out, as well as funding the SAF and RSF. Further, because most countries neighboring Sudan have good relations with the UAE, they are generally unwilling to condemn the UAE or the RSF. All P5 members also have positive relations with the UAE, as do most European states, effectively preventing meaningful sanctions. The Third Sudanese Civil War is a devastating conflict that has already claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands, and the media’s framing of it as a “forgotten conflict” is a disservice to the millions still suffering every day. As Mathilde Vu so eloquently puts it: “Forgetting is unintentional, but neglect is a political choice. And neglect is what we see in Sudan.”